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THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' CASE-
INCLUDING A REPLY TO PROFESSOR STEFFEN
WM, DWIGHT WHITNEYi
THE so-called Investment Bankers' case is well worthy of study because, in
reviewing the business and financial history of half a century, it provided a
testing ground, not merely for our uniquely American system of trying major
commerce cases according to formal court procedure, but also for methods and
standards of business conduct which extend beyond finance and indeed through-
out American trade and commerce. This was a "Big Case" par excellence.
THE CoURT
Several factors combined to qualify Judge Medina to test the basic theory
of antitrust law that great questions of commerce should be tried in open
court. First, he had been a leader of the bar in practical every-day litigation,
mostly commercial cases. 2 Second, in his short tenure as a Federal Judge he
had gained unique familiarity with the federal law of conspiracy.3 And third,
tMember of the New York and Federal Bars. This is a reply, by invitation, to
Professor Steffen's article, The Investment Bankers' Case: Some Observations, 64 YA=x
L.J. 169 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Sleffen). Mr. Whitney participated on behalf of
two of the defendant banking firms throughout the trial (1950-1953), as well as through-
out the preliminary stages (1948-1950) of the case, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
1. There were 309 courtroom days and 25 days of hearing in chambers as well as a
great number of days in pre-trial hearing (including 80 days of taking depositions); the
stenographic trial transcript constituted 23,962 printed pages; there were 4,469 separate
documents offered in evidence out of a stipulated total of 10,640; and in all there were
printed in the course of the litigation approdmately 100,000 pages of material. United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
2. The Judge, formerly an Associate Professor of Law at Columbia University, was
the author of ManINlA's Bosvwicx (1952), a book of New York procedural and substan-
tive forms, and of a NEw Yoan Cvi. Pncrzcn M uANU (1939). For almost two
generations his lectures on New York procedural and substantive law have been the
core of the young lawyer's preparation for the New York Bar examinations and, perhaps
because his former students so frequently retained him, the number of appellate cases
argued by Judge Medina in New York courts is probably several times that argued by
any other practitioner. The author heard Judge Medina casually refer, in a speech before
the New York County Lawyers' Association, to an incident that occurred during "my
five hundredth argument before the Appellate Division, First Department."
3. Judge Medina was the district court judge in the Communist conspiracy case,
United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), affirming 183 F2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
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he was not predisposed one way or the other by experience in the subject-
matter of the case-financing on a national scale 4-or in its special legal back-
ground-Sherman Act and antitrust cases generally. Throughout the early
stages of the case the Judge was severe in restricting any interjections from
defense counsel which seemed to him likely to interrupt the flow of presentation
of the Government's opening speeches and evidence. The court's open criticism
of the positions taken by Government counsel, which were daily reported in
the financial columns of the press during the later stages of the trial, came
only after the trial had progressed far enough for the court to have become
familiar with the evidence.
Professor Steffen concludes his article with a statement that it constituted
error for the court to permit defense counsel to make its extended opening
statement, and that this alone could properly have been grounds for appeal to
the Supreme Court. But the Government waived this ground of appeal, when
Mr. Holmes Baldridge, Chief Counsel for the Government, and senior to Pro-
fessor Steffen, opened his rebuttal argument on March 13, 1951:
"I might say that in my 12 years of antitrust litigation I have never
been before a Court who was more eager to get all the facts in order to
fully understand the basic issues before the introduction of evidence ....
And in this respect I think we will all agree that these openings have
been unique. I earnestly hope that they will set a new pattern for a
better understanding of the complicated factual, economic and legal prob-
lems which are involved in such cases. I want to say in addition that I
would be less than candid if I did not admit that the defense openings
have given the Government itself a better understanding of its own case;
because who knows better than the defendants themselves the industry
of which they are a part ?"O
Besides assisting the court, the extended openings were in the interest of fair-
ness to the defense. The Government had indicated its intention to make the
case a purely documentary one, and had handed up four printed briefs con-
taining a mass of material which the defense believed to include misstatements
4. He said, "with reference to these names-just as I indicated yesterday about Mr.
Jesse Jones, of course I had heard the name 'Jesse Jones' but I did not know much about
him .... Now just assume, and you will be right 99 per cent of the time that I do not
know these things, because I have been busy as a lawyer .... I did not keep up with all
these other things except in so far as they came up in some case that I had as a
lawyer . .. ." Transcript of Record, pp. 1075-76, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
5. Judge Medina opened the fifth day of the Government's opening speeches with a
suggestion to Government counsel that they aid him with the law: "[T]his whole subject
is one of which I am profoundly ignorant, not only the antitrust law, with which I have
had absolutely no contact at all in my professional experience-well, when 'I say not at
all' it is so small that it is almost negligible-and in economics there again I have no
background in that subject, nor do I know anything about these banking practices." Id.
at 359.
6. Id. at 4427,
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of fact.7 The openings provided defense counsel an opportunity to reply.
Furthermore, although during the Government's initial opening, defense coun-
sel were forbidden to interrupt, another rule applied during defense counsel's
opening. Government counsel were free, and indeed invited, to interrupt at
any stage,8 a privilege of which they quite properly took frequent advantage.
Throughout the trial judge Medina took the point of view that he wished
to understand each statement that was made to him and to put before counsel
each thought or viewpoint that occurred to him. Surely this is the way that a
judge is supposed to try any difficult case, either of crime or tort. -Amd a
conspiracy in restraint of trade is both a crime and a tort. Its distinguishing
feature is complexity: it frequently involves the history of an industry over a
period of years, and therefore so much the more requires understanding by
the Judge before the introduction of evidence.
In this case our most complex body of law was to be applied to what is
probably our most complex form of business. When the two were brought
into juxtaposition before a judge unfamiliar with either, he had a choice of
two courses. He could sit back and let documents pile up on his desk and let
statements of fact flow across his consciousness, without attempting to read
the one or check the other. Inevitably he would be bewildered and, from the
defense point of view, subjected to a sort of pro-plaintiff brain washing. The
other course would be to read each document when presented and to under-
stand each oral statement as made. Those who object to Judge Medina's choice
of the second course are simply objecting to a fair trial according to Anglo-
American procedure. They are objecting to the whole system, imposed by
the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes, of trying antitrust cases in the
court room according to the regular rules of procedure.
THE FUNCTION OF INVESTMENT BANXING
Turning from considerations of court and procedure to the substantive sub-
ject matter of the case, it is necessary to understand what is meant by "invest-
ment banker." In the first place, investment bankers are not bankers. Nor
do they invest. The name is an historical misnomer. If banking be described
as the business that banks characteristically do-receive deposits of public
money-it is something that "investment bankers" are forbidden by the Glass-
Steagall Act 9 to do. What investment bankers do, at least so far as this case
is concerned, is (a) to use their own limited capital, plus such borrowing power
as that capital will support, to buy such portion of a long-term security issue
as they can afford, and (b) to endeavor to resell it to investors as quickly as
7. The briefs consisted of four large printed volumes. One, of 81 pages, dealt with
law. The second, of 458 pages, made innumerable statements of fact based on interpre-
tation of exhibits not yet, of course, offered in evidence. This was supplemented by ap-
pendices containing 752 pages of tabular matter. Professor Steffen %vas not then amung
the Government counsel, thirteen of whom signed the briefs.
S. Id. at 39.
9. 48 STAT. 162 (1933), 12 U.S.C. cc. 2, 3, 6 (1952).
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possible. They cannot themselves be investors, or their limited capital would
be locked up and they would go out of business.
Long-term security issues (in the most usual case, stocks or bonds) provide
merely one way of raising money at long term. Issuers (in the most usual
case, corporations) are interested primarily in raising money, rather than the
particular manner or form by which that result is accomplished. Consequently,
investment bankers are not essential to the raising of money, even at long
term. Commercial banks may lend on ten-year notes, for example, or insur-
ance companies and other large aggregations of capital may buy whole issues
for cash. Thus, suppose that a large corporation wishes to raise $50,000,000
at long term; it can, and indeed today usually does, find one or more insur-
ance companies in a position to buy the entire issue as an outright purchase and
sale transaction.' 0 No investment banker has adequate capital for such a pur-
pose. Indeed, the seventeen defendants were not even the investment bankers
with the largest capital, and there were several hundred other firms in the
business, many of very substantial capital." Really, the seventeen defendants
were merely the most competitive in the era that the Government was chiefly
thinking about, 1934 to 1947.
Essentially, an "investment banking" firm is a combination of men of two
different kinds-men with capital and men with a great deal of initiative and
enterprise. Their primary business is to suggest to a corporate borrower a
form of publicly issued security by which it can raise capital better than through
a sale to insurance companies or to its own stockholders. Because the cor-
poration wishes to be assured of the money, the investment banker's suggestion
must carry with it an undertaking (a) to use his own capital to underwrite a
portion of the issue and (b) to find among other "investment bankers" addi-
tional so-called "participants" in the underwriting in sufficient number to pur-
chase in the aggregate the whole issue.
There are, of course, innumerable securities already issued and outstanding
in the open market. Professor Steffen is right in saying that the case was not
directly concerned with these. Yet what must be evident is that the price of
comparable securities in the open market on any given day, or indeed from
hour to hour during market hours, must govern the price at which a new
security can be offered.
PRICE-COMPETITION AND PLAN-COMPETITION
The most frequently claimed achievement of compulsory "competitive bid-
ding," bidding through publicly invited sealed bids for an already created
"security," is that the borrower obtains a price perhaps one-half of one per
10. The data stipulated at the trial showed that of the dollar volume of bond financing
in 1947-1949 for which submission to public sealed bidding was not required, less than
fifteen percent was underwritten.
11. Finance, March 15, 1950 (the year that the trial commenced) showed only seven
investment banking firms in the United States with over $10,000,000 of capital of which
two were defendants.
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cent higher than he would have obtained if he had employed an investment
banker to work with him in setting up and marketing the security. But stocks
on the market fluctuate in the course of every day at least one-half of one
per cent; anyone can turn to the newspapers or to the ticker tape and see
prices constantly changing. The same is true, within a smaller percentage
range, of bonds. It is the general market that controls absolutely the price
at which a new issue can be offered. And it is far more important to the
borrower that his new security be wisely prepared and its issuance properly
timed than that he realize any particular percentage of the issue price-price
being in the end determined by the market.
Indeed, if it were not more important to the corporation that the utmost
skill and resourcefulness be devoted to preparation of the issue than that any
particular price be paid for it, investment bankers would be out of business.
An issue that is bought by an insurance company for cash need not qualify
under the Securities Act, for it is not underwritten. The cost of registration
and underwriting, both inherent in the function of investment banking, must
be added to the price of a public issue. Thus, what the banker must do is, by
his skill and ingenuity, to devise a better security which, he hopes, will com-
mand a price high enough to offset the added costs of underwriting and regis-
tration under the Securities Act. This is what Professor Steffen at one point
calls "plan-competition" as distinct from "price-competition."
"Plan-competition" is the principal form of competition not merely by in-
vestment bankers against large aggregations of capital, but also by investment
bankers against one another. That was proved by abundant examples in the
Government's own documentary evidence and by depositions read at the trial.
As a single example, in 1935 defendant Kuhn, Loeb & Co. took the leader-
ship of Bethlehem Steel issues away from E.B. Smith & Co., predecessor of
defendant Smith, Barney & Co., and the "claimed successor" of Guaranty Com-
pany, notvithstanding many years of "satisfactory" and "continuing relation"
between Guaranty and Bethlehem. Kuhn, Loeb & Co. got the Bethlehem busi-
ness because it was able to suggest a modification in the terms of a mort-
gage that enabled an issue of bonds, already largely prepared by the efforts of
E.B. Smith, to be sold at a slightly higher price. -12 In effect, every case of
"plan-competition" results in "price-competition": a different plan by defi-
nition provides a different security, which normally must command a different
price, unless the changes happen to cancel out. What distinguishes "plan-
competition" as such is that a corporation may prefer a better plan-better
from the viewpoint of its special requirements, e.g., to balance its capital
structure--even at a slightly higher price.
Nor was it proved in the case that "price-competition" as such did not exist.
In 1945, for example, a group of bankers, headed by defendants Kuhn, Loeb
& Co. and Blyth & Co., Inc., was able at the last moment to take an issue of
12. Transcript of Record, pp. 7882, S099, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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Pan-American Airways stock away from Atlas Corporation, which was work-
ing with defendant Lehman Brothers, on the sole ground that they asked a
lower price for underwriting.' 3 There were many more examples.
"Plan-competition" was, in the jargon of the trial, competition as to what
should constitute the "It," the security to be offered. There is an almost
infinite variety of provisions which may be combined to constitute the "It."
And what is the right combination may fluctuate from day to day with the
market. An essential element of the service offered by the investment banker
is to assist the issuer in answering such questions as: Shall the new security be
a stock or a bond? If a stock, preferred or common? Must or shall it be
offered to shareholders? If preferred, cumulative or noncumulative? Con-
vertible? Redeemable? What dividend rate? How underwritten? How many
shares? To be offered at what price below the market? If a bond, what in-
terest rate? What maturity? Shall there be a sinking fund? If so, cumulative
or not, and over how many years? Redeemable? If so, when and on what
terms? Shall there be mortgage security? If so, what?
The answers to these questions are settled only in the prospectus and regis-
tration statement, and in the trust indenture, the amendments to the certifi-
cate of incorporation, and the other documents whose form cannot be final
until the moment of registration. The Government's original notion seemed
to be that the final security springs like Minerva from the head of Jove or
rises like Aphrodite unclothed in all its beauty from the waves, to be then
offered for sale to the highest bidder, or alternatively, if that is not so, that
it ought to be so, and that Judge Medina ought by decree in a federal court
to make it so. To this author this was and remains a wholly unrealistic view.
THE COMPLAINT
The theoretical nature of the Government's viewpoint is illustrated by the
brilliant integration of the complaint, all of whose numerous paragraphs and
subparagraphs neatly interrelate to describe an alleged conspiratorial industry,
in which each segment meshes with the others as smoothly and harmoniously
as the bones and tissues of the human body.14
The Conspiracy Charged
Part VI of the complaint was entitled "Offenses Charged" and included
paragraphs 43-45. Professor Steffen describes paragraph 43 as the "charging
paragraph," but there is nothing in the complaint to distinguish it in this
13. The two price offers appear in Gov't Exhibits 1520 and 1521, Transcript of
Record, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For the full story
see also Gov't Exhibits 1505-22 and Harrison, Ripley Exhibits 16-21, ibid.
14. A principal author of the complaint was Professor Steffen. Indeed, lie reported
it as one of his academic publications. See REPORT OF THE DEAx OF THlE LAW SCHOOL
FOR THE AcADEmiC YEAR 1947-1948 (Yale Univ. Bull., Ser. 44, No. 17) p. 58, "Bibliogra-
phy of the Faculty 1947-48," at p. 64: "STEFFEN, ROSCOE TURNER ... Complaint
in United States of America v. Henry S. Morgan, el a/., in the District Court of the
[Vol.64:319
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respect from paragraphs 44 and 45. Paragraph 43 is a single sentence com-
mencing with the phrase:
"Beginning in or about the year 1915 and continuing thereafter up to
and including the date of the filing of this complaint, the defendants named
herein, have engaged, knowingly and continuously, in a wrongful and un-
lawful conspiracy to restrain unreasonably and to monopolize the securi-
ties business of the United States ... all in restraint and in monopoliza-
tion of the interstate commerce described in this complaint, in violation
of Sections 1 and 2 of... the Sherman Act...
Professor Steffen maintains that the subsequent paragraphs alleged only the
"means" by which the conspiracy charged in paragraph 43 was carried out.
But paragraph 44, consistent with its being an integral part of the chapter
entitled "Offenses Charged," did not confine itself to "means." Every sub-
division of paragraph 44 is governed by a single introductory clause reading
as follows:
"The conspiracy has consisted of a continuing agreement and concert
of action among the defendants, the substantial terms of which have been
that defendants :-16
Thus, paragraph 44 purported to be a description of what the conspiracy itself
consisted of. The conspiracy was here said to consist of an agreement.', And
the paragraph was a recital, not of "means" only for carrying out the con-
spiracy, but of the very "terms" of the conspiracy.
Professor Steffen's quotation of paragraph 44 as though it con.tituted a
recital only of "means" is a distortion of critical importance. It enables him
United States for the Southern District of New York, Civil Action No. 43-757, fled
October 30, 1947. Vashington, Government Printing Office, 1947, 56 pp. (With vthr .I"
15. Professor Steffen says "Judge 2Mcdina does not make an analy,is of the several
counts alleged in Paragraph 43 of the complaint." Steffin, p. 176. But there %was in fact
no division into counts. The division of a pleading into counts, when that will facilitate
clarity, is the responsibility of the pleader. FED. R. Cxv. P. 10(b). When Profes'or
Steffen wrote that "the two counts, charging first a conspiracy to restrain trade and
secondly a conspiracy to monopolize, are simply run together and described as constituting
one single offense," Steffen, pp. 176-77, he xas criticizing not the Judge but the pleader.
Professor Steffen gives his view of the law in these terms: "Of course, there is no
'conspiracy' known to the law--integrated, over-all or otherwise-which comprises boil:
'monopoly' and 'restraint of trade.' " Steffen, p. 177. This is patent error. Section I of
the Sherman Act condemns "conspiracy in restraint of trade," and section 2 condemns
"conspiracy to monopolize." Innumerable cases have recognized that the -came conspiracy
can "comprise" both. As a single example, Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 109 (1948), speaks of the defendants having "formed a conspiracy
in violation of § 1 and § 2 of the Act."
16. Emphasis added. Professor Steffen repeatedly quotes from para. 44 and never
once quotes this, its introductory clause, which governs the whole.
17. Professor Steffen consistently speaks of the conspiracy as if it consisted only
of a "unity of purpose" or "a common plan or design," as distinct from the alleged
actual "agreement." Steffen, p. 176. In fact, no agreement was ever proved or sought
to be proved.
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to advance the thesis that any one of these "means" could have been used by
but one of the seventeen conspirators and still have been received in evidence
against them all.' 8 But the activities of one co-conspirator are inadmissible as
evidence of the "terms" of a conspiracy. The Government's case was that all
of the defendant firms had consistently adhered to each of the alleged practices,
that these practices must, therefore, have been not merely "means" but "terms"
of a conspiracy, and that the court should infer from the fact of uniform ad-
herence to such terms that they had been agreed upon.' 9 Accordingly, when
the Government was unable to prove that the defendant firms did in fact ad-
here to them, no case was left.
Professor Steffen writes as if it were accepted that there was a conspiracy,
and as if all that remained was to show just what the seventeen conspirators
did. In his article, as throughout the trial, he has consistently used the phrase
"the defendants" as though they were already a proved unit.20 On this basis,
the seventeen leading firms in almost any industry could be charged with
conspiracy. What constitutes an "industry" is that those in it are more or
less engaged in the same sort of activity. To say that simply because seventeen
firms or seventeen persons are engaged in the same sort of activity, they must
have a common plan and purpose-as the article consistently suggests-or a
fortiori they must have been in a common agreement and concert of action-
as the complaint charged-would be to condemn every one. The question in
each case is whether the sort of activity that is in question is the nature of
18. "Pattern in a price-conspiracy case ... is not essential, or even to be expected,
at a 'means' level." Steffen, p. 185.
19. For example, on the sixth day of Mr. Baldridge's opening rebuttal foi the Govern-
ment, the Court summed up the Government's position: "adherence to these practices,
such as traditional banker, historical position, and reciprocity ... with knowledge of the
fact that all the others were doing the same thing ... is evidence from which I may draw
an inference." "Mr. Baldridge: That is correct your Honor." Transcript of Record, p.
4901, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
20. For example, he speaks of syndicates managed by "the defendant bankers," of
"their syndicates," of prices maintained "at defendants' sole discretion" and of prices
stabilized "as defendants had thought best"; he says that "the seventeen defendant
bankers . . . managed over seventy per cent of all issues" of a certain type, that they
"managed security issues aggregating $17,337,087,000," that "the defendants actually
have developed their way of doing business" and that, regarding the alleged "traditional-
banker way of doing business," it must have been the defendants who "planned it that
way. Who else?" But the evidence related either to the whole industry or to a particular
defendant independently. There are, therefore, two fallacies in Professor Steffen's assump-
tions: (1) that evidence of what the industry does is evidence that the defendants (sevent-
teen of the several hundred bankers) forced it on the industry, and (2) that evidence
of what one defendant did or said is evidence that the defendants as a group had agreed
upon it. Judge Medina early spotted the fallacy of assuming conspiracy and ordered
the plaintiff to refrain from referring to "the defendants" as a group until they were
proved to be a group. Pre-Trial Order No. 3, para. C(2), United States v. Morgan,
11 F.R.D. 445, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). But the court's order could not control articles
written after the trial.
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the business or is the result of an agreement among the defendants. There is
not space here to review all of the twenty-eight different practices alleged in
paragraph 44 to have been terms of the conspiracy. But we can discuss the
same ones which received the principal attention both of Judge Medina and
of Professor Steffen, and from them as examples show the fallacy in the latter's
reasoning.
The Syndicate Method: A Charge of Conspiracy
The first practice alleged was that the defendants had agreed not to compete
and had agreed to divide the merchandising of security issues among them
"(1) By employing the syndicate method to merchandise the security issues
so handled."'2 1 As we have seen, the syndicate method is essential to the very
existence of the industry. A corporation may wish to float a fifty million dollar
bond issue. An insurance company with five or six billion dollars of capital
and eleven or twelve billions of assets can buy the issue, or, at least, three or
four insurance companies can join together to buy it. But it is impossible for
the partners in a Wall Street banking firm, with a few million dollars capital,
to buy the issue. It only becomes possible when they form a joint venture or
syndicate with other firms so that in the aggregate they are capable of compet-
ing with the insurance companies. This has always been true, and must be
true, of the investment banking business. To say, therefore, that the Govern-
ment has proved a conspiracy because investment bankers "employed the syn-
dicate method" is, to anyone familiar with the simple mathematics of finance,
to say exactly nothing.
But Judge Medina gave to the Government full opportunity to prove the
allegation that employment of the syndicate method was something that de-
fendant bankers had conspired to do. And the author of the complaint intended
to prove this, for he alleged in paragraph 27: "The modern syndicate method
of distributing securities was invented by defendant banking firms and their
predecessors in 1915 .... 22 And he opened the whole subject of "Offenses
Charged" by commencing the one sentence charge in paragraph 43 with the
connected phrase: "Beginning in and about the year 1915 and continuing
thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this complaint, the de-
fendants named herein have engaged ... 23
21. Complaint, para. 44(A) (1).
22. In his article Professor Steffen adheres to the argument, saying that "the syndi-
cate is beautifully contrived as a safety valve to prevent any unseemly competitive ex-
plosion." Steffen, p. 173 (emphasis added). This is the same notion as that pleaded, tic.,
that the syndicate "was invented by defendant banking firms." To poke fun at Judge
Medina for investigating the question is hardly fair: "Who invented 'The Syndicate
System' next becomes a question of great moment." Steffen, p. 17&
23. When Professor Steffen quotes his "charging paragraph," in the text, he omits
its introductory lines relating to 1915, although it is quoted in full in footnote. Steffen,
p. 172 n.21. But the court had to take the paragraph in the form Professor Steffen had
written it as Government lawyer and not in the form in which he attempts to highlight
it as critic after the event.
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The "Triple Concept" Charge: A Charge of Conspiracy
Paragraph 44A went on to charge that among the "substantial terms" of the
"continuing agreement and concert of action" constituting the "conspiracy"
among the defendants was their agreement not to compete:
"(2) By recognizing and deferring to the claims of the defendant tra-
ditional bankers to manage and co-manage and control the merchandis-
ing of the securities of particular issuers.24
"(3) By determining their respective participations and positions in
buying groups in accordance with the concept of historical position."
"(4) By reciprocally exchanging participations in the buying groups
which they manage. 26
This came to be known as the "triple concept" charge--"concept" because the
Government soon realized the weakness of its evidence as proof of a "practice"
and preferred to condemn a "concept." But thoughts are not yet illegal, and
anyway "traditional banker" proved in fact not to have been a phrase in use
in the industry.27 Yet the Government from the beginning agreed that "tradi-
tional banker" was, of the three concepts, the one upon which the other two
depended. 28 The suggestion was that whenever banker B found that banker
A had managed a prior issue, B deferred to A and refused to compete for the
management of a subsequent issue (A being called by the Government "the
24. Yet Professor Steffen says flatly, "The complaint, Paragraph 44A(2), does not
charge that the defendants by 'joint action' conspired in advance to recognize and defc'r
to certain of their number as the 'traditional' bankers for certain [sic] issuers." Steffen,
p. 182. At another point he reduces para. 44A(2) to an allegation that defendant bankers
"at times" recognize and defer to the claims of traditional bankers and proceeds to chide
the Judge for having "with a great show of virtue" made his finding on the basis of what
was actually pleaded-that it was a term of the conspiracy that defendants should thus
"recognize and defer." Steffen, p. 183.
25. Professor Steffen makes the point that the court found "that defendant bankers
do make claims to 'historical position' and that, as managers, they do rccognizc such
claims . . . . Also, that defendants . . . have denied participation . . . to many bankers
who do not have historical position." Steffen, p. 186 (emphasis in original). But these
were only findings that certain things happen. The complaint was different altogether,
in alleging that the defendants conspired by agreement not to compete at all but rather
to "determine their positions in buying groups in accordance with the concept of historical
position."
26. Yet Professor Steffen says that the alleged conspiracy to control channels of
distribution and to fix prices was "the only . . . conspiracy-charged in the complaint."
Steffen, p. 172 (emphasis in original).
27. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
28. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, pp. 4492-93, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp,
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), Mr. Baldridge in opening: "Hence we submit that that direct exclusion
of competitors by common adherence of the concepts of historical position and reciprocity
was necessarily subsidiary to the understanding embodied in the traditional banker con-
cept." Cf. Professor Steffen's entire omission of the traditional banker charge in his own
opening summary, the 3rd paragraph of his article, Steffen, p. 170, and his attempt to
dispose of all the "triple concept" allegations by calling them "merely the a fortiori parts
of the case." Steffen, p. 174. But he later turns about and excoriates the Judge for making
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traditional banker") ; that A then invited into his syndicate those who had
participated in the previous issue (according to what the Government called
their "historical position"); and finally that those who participated in A's
syndicate "reciprocated" by inviting A into syndicates which they managed,
thus blocking off competition.
In paragraph 44B, to which both the court and Professor Steffen have de-
voted considerable attention, the "traditional banker" concept reappeared. The
paragraph alleged that one of the terms of the conspiracy by agreement among
the defendants was: "to eliminate the competition of other investment bankers
... (1) By establishing and maintaining relationships with issuers which give
to and preserve for defendant banking firms domination and control over the
merchandising of all issues of securities which emanate from such issuers."
Judge Medina discerned that this was an essential element of the Govern-
ment's case: if the bankers did not dominate and control the issuers, they
would have difficulty in making effective their alleged conspiracy not to com-
pete among themselves, for the issuers could simply go to other investment
bankers outside the conspiracy, or to insurance companies. It was not "a straw
man" that the court knocked down but an important element of the con-
spiracy.29
In paragraph 45, the "traditional banker" theme was developed. Paragraph
45 contained numerous subparagraphs. But, like paragraph 44, they were
governed by one introductory clause:
"During the period of time covered by this complaint, and for the pur-
pose of forming and effectuating the conspiracy, the defendants, by agree-
an identical appraisal of the famous triple concept as possibly "mere dialectics.' Sleffen,
p. 180.
A further e-xample of this inconsistency is provided by Professor Steffen's treatment oi
twin paragraphs in the introductory portion of the complaint. Both para. 24 and para. 25
allege that the investment banker does not charge a fee but obtains his revard through
merchandising security issues, para. 25 adding that this is sometimes consequent on his
advice to and alleged control of the business affairs of an issuer. When Professor Steffen
relies on this allegation he calls it the "core of the Government's case" Steffcn, p. 173;
but when Judge Medina deals with the identical allegation, Professor Steffen says that
"the court now seized on this minor introductory allegation and inflated it into a ma.is
charge in the case." Steffen, p. 180.
29. Professor Steffen argues that "the monopoly aspects of the case" were separately
alleged and that it is "there" that "the seventeen defendants are alleged to b2 arrayed
against the industry." Steffen, p. 177. This finds no support in the complaint. One of
the allegations of conspiracy to control issuers, complaint, paa. 45A(10), was coupled
with the allegatioR that defendants caused their partners to go on boards of directors. This
was considered important by Government counsel, for, as Professor Steffen says,
"The evidence before the court had largely to do with directorships ... ." Sleffen, p. 181.
He then attacks the court for its handling of that issue: "But the court said: 'No attempt
was made to show the circumstances under which any of these men became directors,'
as if that were material. And he [the court] went on to say that 'in many cases the men
in question were invited by the management to come on the board,' and many were men
'of proven competence and judgment'--both matters not in controversy." Steffcn, p. 131.
If those matters were not in controversy, what was? Normal election of a banker as a
director would by itself have no more significance than normal electiun of anyone els.
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ment and concert of action, have done the things they agreed to do as
hereinabove alleged, and, among others, the following acts and things :" 0
As with paragraph 44, therefore, this was an allegation of agreement-an
agreement not merely on effectuating, but for the purpose of forming, the
conspiracy. After a subparagraph A, "Defendants formulated and adopted,
subsequently operated, and now operate pursuant to, among others, the follow-
ing restrictive customs and practices :"1 there followed such allegations as
the following:
"(1) Whenever an issuer agrees to permit one of the defendant bank-
ing firms to manage the merchandising of a security issue, the other
defendant banking firms recognize this as establishing a continuing banker-
client relationship and recognize such firm as the traditional banker for
the issuer, exclusively entitled to act thereafter for the issuer in merchan-
dising its future security issues. A defendant traditional banker's recog-
nized exclusive relationships in this respect continue indefinitely and, upon
dissolution or reorganization of an investment banking firm acting as tra-
ditional banker, the other defendant banking firms agree as to which de-
fendant banking firm or firms, if any, they will thereafter recognize as
successor or successors .... When one of the defendant banking firms is
the traditional banker for an issuer, none of the other defendants will dis-
cuss or undertake the merchandising of new security issues for that issuer.
Defendant banking firms observe an ethic not to compete and refuse to
'poach on each other's preserves.'
9c"4* .... Once a defendant banking firm has been selected as an under-
writer in a buying group formed to merchandise a security issue, it is
recognized by the other defendant banking firms as having certain pro-
prietary rights or historical position and is granted an opportunity to par-
ticipate in every buying group thereafter formed to merchandise future
security issues of the same issuer, and the extent of the participation and
group position offered to such firm is usually the same ....
30. Emphasis added.
31. In the light of the phrases "effectuating the conspiracy," "agreement and concert
of action," "formulated and adopted," and the general tenor of the whole, Professor
Steffen's statement that paragraph 45 deals only with the "restrictive customs and prac-
tices" has a hollow sound. Steffen, p. 182. Yet these and Professor Steffen's other
abbreviated quotations are preceded by a sentence to the effect that the charges will be
quoted in the article "as precisely alleged in the complaint." Steffen, p. 171. Professor
Steffen goes on to belittle the Judge's work on this ten-page para. 45: "But the court
seems never to have been able to get hold of the basic charge of the alleged conspiracy,
and so he pursued each alleged 'means' to exhaustion as if it were charged as the nexus
of the conspiracy. In this instance the court was able to reach over to Paragraph 45,
dealing with 'restrictive customs and practices,' to lend credence to his point .... Of
course, to anyone familiar with pleading, that is a funny place to go for a statement of
the offenses charged." Steffen, p. 182-83. The fact is that Professor Steffen is repudiating
his own complaint, for he says later, "The only 'concert of action' having any bite in it
is that charged in Paragraph 43." Steffen, p. 183. If there was no "bite" in paragraph
45, or for that matter in paragraph 44, it may be right to say that the court ought to
have ignored them. But if he had, the Government's case would have dissolved before it
started.
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On any fair reading of the English language, these were allegations that
the defendants had agreed among themselves to do all these things, and to do
them regularly.32 By the time of the dosing speeches the Government was
forced to concede that no such system operated, and they then made the "lesser
charge" that a defendant competed with what was called "the traditional
banker" only if he believed that the latter's relations with the issuer were not
"satisfactory.13 3 Quite apart from the fact that the Government did not prove
even this lesser charge, it amounted in theory only to charging that individual
defendant firms followed the practice of not going after competitive business
unless they thought they had a chance of getting it."-1
"The Mosaic" and the Scarch for a "Unifying Elcment"
Judge Medina announced his program at the outset of the trial: "I am going
to try my best to get the Government's position on all these things and rely on
my own common sense when we get to the evidence later, to scrutinize it care-
fully and to do what you have to do in every other case."36 It was on this basis
that he received all the evidence, and considered what the Government called
its mosaic, stone by stone, although in a memorandum at the conclusion of the
opening speeches he had said that the unifying elements of the conspiracy still
remain obscure.36 He was seeking for some element from which he might
infer that the defendant firms were in fact united in some common agreement
or concert of action. Now, precisely because he sought to find some "unifying
element" by which the allegation of conspiracy might be sustained, he is
pilloried by the author of the original complaint.3,
32. Professor Steffen now waters these down into allegations "tInt many such banker-
client relationships are recognized by defendant bankers as 'traditional,' " Stcffen, p. 174
(emphasis added), and "that, by use of the 'historical position' concept, many syndicates
have become vwre or less static from issue to issue," bi& (emphasis added).
33. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Brief
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Connect the Evidence, (April 15, 1953), pt. I Passim,
United States v. Morgan, supra, and the dosing arguments for the Government, Tran-
script of Record, p. 20,143 et seq., United States v. M6forgan, mspra.
34. This is where the Fifth Avenue versus Grand Street analogy came into play.
Cf. Steffen, p. 190. The defense pointed out that although a cloak and suit man in the old
days in Grand Street might have clutched at the sleeve of a customer entering a com-
petitor's shop, even though the customer was satisfied with the competitor, there was no
more reason why two investment banking firms, seeking the managership of an issue
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, for example, should expect to
succeed by clutching at the sleeve of the President of A.T. & T. than there was for Broo!:s
Brothers or Tripler's to expect in that fashion to intercept customers whom they saw
entering the shop of a competitor.
35. Transcript of Record, p. 38, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). Indeed Professor Steffen's rigid insistence upon the paramountcy of the complaint
would seem strange in the light of the policy of flexibility behind the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, were it not that the Government did in fact adhere tenaciously through-
out the trial to all the essential allegations of the complaint and made amendments to
only a few clauses.
36. United States v. Morgan, 11 F.R.D. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37. The court was not looking for a "mechanical" unifying clement. He understood
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At least Professor Steffen and this author can agree that "it is a common-
place that the presence or absence of conspiracy must be determined by an
examination of all the circumstances."38 That was precisely what Judge Medina
did, and what Professor Steffen sedulously avoids doing. At practically no
point in his entire article does Professor Steffen deal with the evidence. A
characteristic way of his disposing of the evidence is found in the sentence
immediately preceding the one last quoted about "all the circumstances." In
that sentence there is reference to the allegations of "[1] common member-
ship in the Investment Bankers Association, [2] the keeping of reciprocity
records, or [3] the invention of the syndicate system."30 Having named them,
Professor Steffen says nothing about their merits. But let us consider the
first two as samples-the third will be considered later.
In many antitrust cases against industries in which there are many small
concerns and none really dominant, a trade association is found to have
operated as a restraining or monopolizing conspiracy. In this case the In-
vestment Bankers Association was named as a defendant, along with the
seventeen firms, and a great deal of evidence was introduced against it. But
after the evidence had shown on its face the innocence of the activities of
that association, the Government voluntarily moved to dismiss it as a de-
fendant.40
Even more promising, from the Government's viewpoint, was the allegation
that the defendants had agreed to exchange participations in the buying
groups which they respectively managed and that they kept reciprocity records.
From the moment he first heard this allegation Judge Medina identified it
as one which, if proved, would make it very difficult for the defendants to
escape an adverse judgment. The allegation was paragraph 45A(3):
"Defendant banking firms, in forming buying groups, select on a
reciprocal basis, other defendant banking firms as underwriters. Over
a period of time, the amount of gross spreads which one of such firms
enables another to earn by selecting it for participation in buying groups
is substantially equivalent (with due allowance for differentials in prestige
and underwriting strength) to the amount of gross spreads it has earned
in the same period of time as a participant in buying groups formed and
managed by such other firm. Each defendant banking firm keeps a re-
ciprocity record to show the business it has given to each of the other
perfectly the "mechanical" fallacy that Professor Steffen is still trying to pin upon hin,
See United States v. Morgan, 11 F.R.D. 445, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Transcript
of Record, p. 4652, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). But
some "unifying element" was the essential ingredient of the Government case. Only as a
proved combination could the defendants reach the position of dominance of an Aluminum
Company, for example. The issues in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), cf. Steffen, p. 170, could not arise here until the combination had
been proved.
38. Steffen, p. 175.
39. Ibid.
40. Transcript of Record, p. 10,775, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
[Vol. 64: 319
THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' CASE
defendant banking firms and the business it has received from each of
such firms."
What happened to the charge that "each defendant banking firm keeps a
reciprocity record" has become reduced even in Professor Steffen's article
to statements "that some of the defendants have kept reciprocity records" 41
and that "at least two witnesses testified on deposition . . . that their
firms do award participations ... on the basis, in part, of business re-
ceived from other bankers or expected in the future." 42 The collapse of proof
was, of course, even more dramatic as it happened at the trial. An allegation
that "each defendant banking firm keeps a reciprocity record" had dwindled
before the outset of the trial to a statement made in the opening that eleven
firms were found to have reciprocity records. No such records were intro-
duced in evidence in respect of nine defendants, and no evidence of any kind
was introduced on the subject in respect of seven of these. As to the re-
maining eight, the records introduced were shown in every case either to be
not real reciprocity records at all or to have been kept solely for the infor-
mation of the particular defendant, without regard to or knowledge of what
any of the others were doing.43 In no case were they records of reciprocity
with other defendants, but always with other bankers generally.44
A TEST CASE
The circumstantial evidence offered by the Government, in the absence of
direct evidence of conspiratorial agreement,45 was to consist in part of ex-
tensive stipulated statistical data,46 and in part of documents from the files
of the defendants. From these the Judge would be asked, at the conclusion
of the evidence, to infer that the defendants had been participants in a con-
spiratorial agreement. The documents were to be the "stones" in the ultimate
"mosaic," whose portrait of a conspiracy would be apparent to the Judge
only after all the "stones" were in.
Meanwhile, however, there was the perfection of the beautifully articulated
complaint, with its recital of the many "customs and practices" to which all
41. Steffen, p. 185 (emphasis in original).
42. Steffen, p. 185.
43. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
44. Transcript of Record, p. 10,843, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 6-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
45. The Government's admissibn from the outset that it could not prove any agree-
ment, except by inference, was made even though it had free access to all the files of
all the defendants. Id. at 336.
46. All financing of the fifteen years, 1935-1949, wvas analyzed for the court and
organized in tabular form, so that for every issue of stocks or bonds over $1,000,000
the description of the issue, the type of transaction, number of underwriters, nature of
underwriting, dollar amount, spread, and name of managing investment banker or
bankers were immediately available. By common agreement bctween the parties the
fifteen-year period seemed to break into five periods of three years each.
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the defendants were alleged to have agreed and which all were alleged to
have followed in practice. Of course, customs and practices as such could
be, and until the contrary is proved in any case must be, presumed to be
customs and practices inherent in the conduct of an industry. Proof even
of universal adherence to customs or practices as such would, without more,
in itself be proof only of the nature of the business. At most it might be
shown that some of the customs and practices are "bad," and need to be
further reformed by statute or by the SEC. But the Sherman Act is not
concerned with what is "bad" unless it restrains or monopolizes. Accord-
ingly, the pleader had not only alleged an agreement to follow particular
customs and practices but, perhaps anticipating that the evidence might fail
to prove this, had also alleged an agreement upon basic so-called "concepts"
which, when agreed to, must in the natural course of business lead to "ad-
herence" to the customs and practices.
At the opening of the trial the Government submitted a printed brief on
the facts which purported to expound the theory of "adherence to concepts"
by quoting from a great number of the documents. But both during the
openings and during the introduction of evidence it became increasingly
apparent that the documents reflected competition rather than agreement not
to compete, and that the same competition was evidenced by the stipulated
statistical data. As evidence of actual practice dwindled, Government counsel
were forced to fall back on the theory of agreement upon mental concept.
Whenever the Judge would point out that a particular document did not
evidence any practice, they would reply that a particular phrase in the docu-
ment evidenced at least adherence to some concept.
An example will illustrate the points. Assume that Mr. A, as president
of bank affiliate C, had as manager handled the underwriting of a securities
issue for corporation X in 1929 and that banking firm B had had a partici-
pation in the underwriting as a member of C's syndicate. C bank was by
the Glass-Steagall Act eliminated from the underwriting business in 1933.
Mr. A then became a partner of investment banking firm A. In 1935 cor-
poration X proposes to make an additional issue of securities. A goes to X
and seeks to handle the underwriting, and in so doing, Mr. A says to the
president-of X words to this effect: "Tom, (or Dick or Harry, as the case
may be) you and I worked hard together in 1929. Ever since that time I
have been in constant touch with you. I know as much as any banker could
know about X corporation. I have now joined A so A is the successor of C.
I can do a better job for you than anyone who is unfamiliar with your
affairs." X then entrusts A with the preparation of the issue.
Now suppose that the partners of investment banking firm B meet, and
its partners say to each other: "Shall we compete for this issue? We don't
know the president of X. And Mr. A has intimate knowledge of X's affairs,
He has had a continuing relation as financial adviser of X, and that relation
is still satisfactory to X. X is a client of Mr. A and is treating his new firm,
A, as the successor of C and therefore as its banker. But we were in the
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syndicate that C organized to handle X's underwriting in 1929, so let's not
waste our time trying to compete with A for the management of this new
issue. Rather let's go to A and point out our historical position in the old
syndicate and. claim an equal or better participating share in A's new syn-
dicate. Perhaps we may later reciprocate by offering to A a participation in
one or more of our syndicates."
The italicized phrases embrace substantially all of the allegedly wicked
thoughts or "concepts." The Government's position was that they are so
inherently unusual, abnormal, and noncompetitive, that the fact that B held
them would in itself be proof that B must have conspired with A. The de-
fendants' position w-as, first, that it was extraordinary to observe how often
the evidence showed that in just such a situation B never entertained such
thoughts at all; second, that even when B did entertain such thoughts, it
was extraordinary how often related and connecting documents showed that
B went ahead and competed anyway; third, that the fact of competition was
further proved by the stipulated statistical data, which showed how frequently
B had succeeded in getting the business away from A; and fourth, that even
if B had such thoughts and acted on them, it was a natural and normal busi-
ness decision, and was not in itself any evidence of conspiracy.
Defendants' first three arguments turned, of course, on the evidence. This
is reviewed in some detail in the court's opinion and is substantially ignored
in Professor Steffen's article. Suffice it to say that on the court's findings
the defendants prevailed on the stipulated facts, and the fourth argument
need never have been made. But it was extensively debated at the trial,
and Professor Steffen still denies its validity.47
In a competitive economy in the real world men on the two sides of a
trade are necessarily in a continuing relation with each other. It is only in
the simplest transactions that price is the only competitive factor. In all other
business relationships, the phrases alleged to have been used by the invest-
ment bankers are common coin. In any trade the man who had previous
and satisfactory relations with the customer will refer to himself as the sup-
plier (cf., "the banker" 48 ) of that customer. His position as supplier, having
47. See, e.g., his statement that "the bare fact that anyone should even make a
claim to 'successorship' in a truly competitive industry is surely unusual." Steffcn, p. 184.
Of course, the essence of competition in every industry is that people make every sort
of claim, and a frequent one is the claim to be the true and only "successor" to some
firm which has had the customer's business before. Professor Steffen adds his usual
statement that "no 'conspiracy' on successorships vas ever charged." Stcf en, p. 184.
Not merely is this belied by the complaint, paras. 45A(1) and (4), but when the Govern-
ment summed up at the conclusion of the case, the conspiracy on "successorships" was
made the first and principal cornerstone of the whole charge Brief in Support of Plain-
tiff's Motion to Connect the Evidence (April 15, 1953), pt. II, p. 24 et seq. United States
v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also closing arguments for the Gov-
ernment, Transcript of Record, p. 20,143 et seq., United States v. Morgan, supra.
48. Of the "concepts" criticized by the Government, "traditional banker" did not come
from industry sources. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 734 (S.D.N.Y.
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existed in the past, is by definition historical. His business relations, like
his human relations, such as invitations to dinner, are normally on the basis
of reciprocity. If he changes from one firm to another, he is sure to tell his
old customers that the new firm is the successor to the old. To retain his
customer's good will, he advises him, and seeks to establish a continuing
relation of the same sort that a lawyer hopes to have with a clicnt. His
customer is one who has followed the custom of dealing with him-has
given him its "custom." The suggestion that these words were badges of
evil, and that their use was evidence of a "code" or an "ethic" in itself evil,
was a revolutionary suggestion, and one that sought to substitute, by judicial
fiat, a governmentally regulated public auction economy for a normal private
enterprise economy.
With the collapse, on the evidence at the trial, of the claims of an actual
conspiracy, Government counsel were forced into Professor Steffen's alter-
native position-the one that has significance for all trade and commerce, not
merely investment banking-that the use of these phrases was in itself in-
consistent with a competitive economy. The argument meant nothing less
than that an industry cannot be competitive unless its participants are for-
bidden to have personal relations with their customers, lest that give them
an undue competitive advantage. And this position explains Professor Stef-
fen's enthusiasm for the so-called competitive bidding system. 40 "Competitive
bidding" was proved at the trial to have been rarely resorted to in practice
by any corporate borrower,5 0 although it has been imposed upon railway
bonds and upon the largest public utilities by decisions of federal, and some
state, regulatory commissions. 51 "Competitive bidding" is nothing more nor
less than compulsory public auction, the article for sale being knocked down
to the highest sealed bid. It eliminates plan-competition because the borrower
sets up his own proposed security. And it reduces competition exclusively
to price-competition. At the trial and in his article Professor Steffen (un-
like any of the other Government counsel who also conducted the trial) has
1953). A phrase that had found some currency in the industry was "the banker"'-that
A is "X's banker."
49. "[T]he evidence dealt with the heart of the case." Steffen, p. 189.
50. The statistical evidence, for example, showed that only 4 out of 2,183 industrial
bond issues had been sold by public sealed bidding over the period of 15 years from
1935 to 1949. Of 2,945 industrial stock issues, one had been sold in that fashion.
51. Less harm can be done by stereotyping the bonds of these industries than
the bonds of active industrials or shares of stock. Yet the SEC and ICC are sometimes
called upon to provide would-be issuers with an exemption from the competitive bidding
requirement. The system compels preoccupation with the single factor of initial price,
the bids frequently differing only by 1/100th or 1/1000th of a per cent. Not unnaturally,
as Judge Medina pointed out, the result has been to eliminate from management in this
theoretically competitive field all except the few largest and most expert firms. See
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). It is not surprising
that only two investment banking firms in the United States favored the position that
was taken under the academic influences prevailing on the SEC aud ICC when these
rules were adopted in 1941 and 1944, respectively.
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been ready to jettison all of the alleged charges of restraint of competition
so long as he can hold to the charge that the defendants had refrained from
"price-competition." This is because he considers that any competitive effort
other than bidding on price is not true competition at all, from which it
follows that anyone who holds any of the cited "concepts" must be engaged
in an unlawful restraint of trade. 2
Professor Steffen conceives that he requires only one more "charge":
that the investment bankers have formed syndicates. Says he, a syndicate
necessarily "stifles competition in channels of distribution."O But here he
is up against the fact that if there were no syndicates, the investment bank-
ing business would not exist at all. Large corporations could then only be
financed by public money, because no private person or group of persons
has enough. But public money has been barred by statute from underwrit-
ing. Consequently, the underwriting of large issues, which can only be done
through syndicates, must disappear. To attack the syndicate method, as Pro-
fessor Steffen does, is to attack the institution of underwriting as such, and
to maintain that security issues should only be sold outright to those who
can afford to buy them-to depositories of public money, such as banks and
insurance companies-unless a syndicate be formed for the sole purpose of
bidding at a public auction in competition with depositories of public moneys.
The complaint did contain a prayer:
52. Once again Professor Steffen returns to the statement that on this issue "no
conspiracy was ever charged ... " Steffen, p. 188. In fact the complaint, para. 44C,
alleged that the conspiracy included an agreement "to prevent, restrain, minimize, and
discredit the use of competitive bidding . .. !
53. Steffen, p. 173. That he is attacking the syndicate method as such is further
sho n- in his answer to the Judge's finding that the 1,300 syndicate agreements in evidence
were infinitely varied: uniformity xwas not in issue, for the charge w.-as not that the
defendants "ever agreed ... to write 'uniform' syndicate agreements." Sicffen, p. 179.
If "uniformity" -as not in issue, what was in issue but the use of the syndicate agree-
ment as such? That his attack is on the syndicate itself is further confirmed by the
statement that "it is wholly immaterial that some other bank or bankers may also have
had a part in developing the system." Ibid.
Indeed, Professor Steffen goes so far as to suggest that the 1,300 syndicate agree-
ments offered in evidence had been written by the defendants all working together. He
says of their differences: "It may, in fact, have been more effective to tailor each
agreement differently, as to minor matters, to serve the alleged common purpose of
eliminating price-competition." Ibid. This statement, at least, seems to merit the adjec-
tive which at one point he applies to Judge Medina-"intemperate." It amounts to a
suggestion that for a generation the principal investment banking firms have vorked in
unison over their agreements in order to introduce enough variations to mislead some
future antitrust prosecutor and court.
Likewise meaningless is Professor Steffen's point that in almost every syndicate
operation which the court considered "from one to fifteen or more of the defendants"
took part. The 1,300 agreements offered in evidence necessarily were made by syndicates
in which defendants took part. Since the defendants were seventeen uf the more inportant
firms in the business it was inevitable that "one to fifteen or more" of them took part.
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"2. That as to any particular security issuer each of the defendant
banking firms be required to elect to function either exclusively as a
financial adviser to such issuer or exclusively as a purchaser in com-
petition with others for resale of the securities put out by such issuer .... "
Passing the question whether the second alternative meant that the individual
firm should not act in a syndicate with others, there are three fatal defects
in this prayer. The first two are of a "legal" character, the third practical.
First, to divide an existing industry into two functions, and to require
each firm to choose one or the other, is essentially a legislative, not a judicial
task. Congress had so acted in requiring, by the Glass-Steagall Act, a division
between the function of receiving deposits and the function of underwriting.
The two functions of advising and merchandising (if they are two) have
been combined throughout the history of the investment banking business.
For a judge to order the business made over in a form considered better by
him would be little short of judicial tyranny. This is not to say that he
lacks constitutional authority to do it, if the defendants had been extreme
in their violation of antitrust law. But it would be an extreme measure.
Second, separation of the two functions, would be an inequitable measure
because it would put the defendants at an enormous disadvantage compared
to their competitors-indeed, would in the author's opinion have put them
out of business. If non-defendant A had worked for months or even years,
as is frequently the case, in developing with issuer X the plan for X's new
security issue, ex-defendant B would not be in a position to compete on
equal terms with A in offering a price for X's security. Nor could B earn
its way acting only as adviser, for its non-defendant competitors would have
the decisive advantage of being able to make good their advice by under-
writing the resultant issue.
Third, it would be impractical. As we have seen, issuers do not like the
separation. The only real business is the buying and selling business, and
the advisory does not exist separately but only as part of the general service
to the issuer. Plan-competition is not only to give the best advice but also
to give the best service over-all in creating the issue and placing it. The
founders of Morgan, Stanley & Co. first considered forming an advising
firm, to be called Ewing & Co., but soon concluded that it was an impractical
idea which issuers would not welcome. Experience with the refusal of issuers
to offer issues at so-called competitive bidding, unless ordered by a Govern-
ment commission to do so, has confirmed their decision.
HISTORY OF INVESTMENT BANKING
It may be asked how the Government came to commence a case that was
so utterly demolished as this one, or how the case could have lasted so long.
In the author's opinion it is unfair to ascribe the former to naivet6 on the
part of Government counsel, although doubtless some was shown and some
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persists,5 or the latter to the extreme lengths to which the court went in
the effort to find some substance in the Government's case, although the
Judge is now criticized for having done so. The real reason for both, in
the author's opinion, is that earlier generations of bankers did use phrase-
ology which indicated a belief in some sort of a code or ethic not to com-
pete,5 5 and that Government counsel wholly failed to appreciate, until con-
fronted by statistical data at the trial, that a revolution has occurred in in-
vestment banking since that time. There was extensive evidence of all the
history, and great detail for the fifteen years preceding trial, 1935-1949. But
three periods should suffice to illustrate the essential points: (1) the period
before the legislation of 1933-1934, the Glass-Steagall Act, the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act; (2) the period immediately after those
statutes, 1934-1937; and (3) the last period for which full statistics were
available at the trial, 1947-1949.
Before 1933
The complaint reflected the traditionally critical conception of the invest-
ment banking business as it existed before 1933.r, Undoubtedly bankers then
professed not to compete 57 and, in the atmosphere of the times, what Judge
Medina has called "dignity and mystery" were prime assets of private
bankers. However, no reform had been recommended to Congress in respect
to investment banking as such, even after the Pujo Investigation in 1913.
In fact, that Committee had regarded the commercial banking aspects of
54. Professor Steffen says that "each of the defendants has long done business by
getting himself named as banker ... for one or many issuers." Siciffen, p. 173. Surely
the purpose of business is to get one's self business, and the antitrust question is not
whether one gets business, but whether he gets it by entering into a conspiracy uith his
potential competitors.
55. That conception of banking ethics exists in England today. Paradoxically, Eng-
land wias held up to the court by the Government as a model. Yet in England not merely
is the buying end of the business continued in the old "traditional" form, but "other people's
money" is used to underwrite.
56. The attitude is evidenced by the popular book BRANDEIS, O en- PEoPUI'S MONEY
(1932), a summary of the disclosures of the Pujo Investigation of 1913. The complaint
bears a striking resemblance to Brandeis' description, but the distinguishing feature
of present-day investment banking is precisely that it is prohibited by law from using
"other people's money."
57. To anyone, however, who has read of the way in which J. P. Morgan & Co. tool:
James J. Hill's railroad business away from Kuhn, Loeb, see AuLEU, JA co I. ScnInF-
His LIn AND Lm-rms, 83-92 (1929), and took the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company business av.ay from Speyer and Lee Higginson, see Gov't Exhibits 821-34,
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Transcript of Record, pp.
12263-SO, United States v. forgan, mipra, the theory that bankers did not compete, even
before World War I, raises a smile of skepticism. The stipulated evidence of pre-1933
issues, showed constant competitive shifting of business from one banker or group of
bankers to another. See Pre-Securities Act Issuer Summary Sheets, Transcript of Record
United States v. Morgan, supra.
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its investigation as more important.5 8 Neither the Wilson administration
nor the Republican administrations that followed it seemed to consider in-
vestment banking in need of legislative reform. Nor did anyone conceive
that the sale of securities was open to federal regulation under the commerce
clause.
Distribution by the normal syndicate in the 1920's differed little from
that of pre-World War I. On a large issue there were often several suc-
cessive syndicates. The first syndicate, the "Purchase Group" would sell to
a "Banking Group," which in turn would sell to an "Underwriting Group,"
and that in turn to a "Selling Group." Each "group" or "syndicate" nor-
mally imposed a joint and several obligation on all the members.,5
Effect of the Legislation of 1933-1934
The disastrous fall in values brought their house down on the bankers'
heads, and out of the successive congressional investigations which featured
the years 1931-1934 there emerged three principal statutes: the Glass-Steagall
Act,60 separating the function of receiving and employing deposits of public
money from the "investment banking" function; the Securities Act, 1 pri-
marily regulating the original issue of securities; and the subsequent, inter-
locking Securities Exchange Act,6 2 primarily regulating the stock exchanges
and securities already issued.
In a real sense, investment banking has since that day been controlled by
legislation, particularly as to form and methods of syndication and distribu-
tion. The Acts of 1933 and 1934 so greatly increased the banker's liability
that they could no longer underwrite each other by assuming joint and
several liability for the whole issue. The syndicates came to impose only
several liability for the amount of each firm's commitment. And the number
of syndicates were reduced normally to two, one to underwrite and one to
sell. Furthermore, by removing the major supply of capital, public deposits,
from availability for underwriting, on the ground that underwriting was too
risky for public money to be used in it, the Glass-Steagall Act reduced the
capital of the largest underwriting firms from the $100,000,000 which had
been in the hands of such firms as J. P. Morgan & Co., National City, and
Chase Securities Co. in the 1920's to a few million dollars.
What seems to have been overlooked, however, was that underwriting
remained just as risky for those who engaged their own capital in it. The
result was paradoxical. On the eve of a great expansion of the nation's
58. Indeed, the investigation resulted in the adoption of the Federal Reserve System.
59. A large number of syndicate agreements from 1908 on were introduced into
evidence. Transcript of Record, p. 13,620, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). The history of syndicate agreements in this country runs back at least
to the period of the Civil War. Id. at 13,613.
60. 48 STAT. 162 (1933), 12 U.S.C. cc. 2, 3, 6 (1952).
61. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1952).
62. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1952).
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economy with its need for ever greater long-term financing, the funds avail-
able for underwriting were enormously reduced. Business was confined to
private firms, where men put up their own capital or raised it from friends,
and to small corporations where a limited number of shareholders were pre-
pared expressly to invest in the speculative investment banking business.63
Each defendant firm had its own peculiar make-up, and each was dissimilar
from the others.64
The new era of financing began with the passage of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. A golden harvest was anticipated by the firms left in the in-
dustry, as a result of the elimination of their competitor, the great commer-
cial bank. Accordingly, their efforts were principally directed toward re-
establishing old contacts. This was particularly true of the firms whose
members included the former officers of the banks or bank affiliates which
had been operative in the 1920's, and which therefore claimed to be suc-
cessors.
6 5
Many of the new firms during the 1934-1937 period took on overly-large
commitments for their small capital and were over-extended at the time of
the sudden sharp recession in the summer of 1937. As a result, the capital
of some of the firms became frozen, and the capital of substantially all was
impaired. A period of travail and readjustment occurred after 1937. It
eventuated in a radical reduction in the size of the commitment by each firm
in a syndicate, thereby increasing the number of firns in each syndikate, and
had an incidentally devastating effect on "historical position." There were
lean years after 1937, intensified by the war, but even more by the duminat-
ing influence of other legislation dating from the depression period. The
successive Income Tax Acts, commencing wvith 1932, substituted life insur-
ance companies for the individual investor as the prime source of lung-term
investment capital.
It was unfortunate that the TNEC investigation 01 came just after this
period, for the examination of a group of the more conservative of the in-
63. Of the defendant firms, ten were partnerships and seven corporations; but of
the latter only one or two had a fairly wide public holding of shares.
64. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 655-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
65. Outstanding were: Harriman, Ripley & Co., then known as Brown Bros.
Harriman & Co., in which leading former officers of National City Company had joined
with former partners of Brown Bros. and of NV. A. Harriman & Co.,; Blyth & Co., which
had been joined by Mr. Charles Mitchell, formerly the head of the National City Com-
pany; F_. B. Smith & Co., formerly a small firm but which had been joined by a number
of former officers of Guaranty Company; and First Boston Corporation, which had been
joined by a number of former partners and officers of Harris Forbes & Co. and of Chase
Securities Corporation.
66. Professor Steffen expresses satisfaction with the conduct of the TNEC inquiry
because "witnesses were treated courteously" and "were permitted to answer questions
fully and in their own way," with counsel "present" although not permitted to take part.
Steffen, p. 169-70. These would appear to be the minimum requirements in a free country
but they, of course, provide no guaranty of truth comparable to a trial where both sides
are heard equally. The present writer is concerned at Professor Steffen's apparunt
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vestment bankers undoubtedly provided Government attorneys ten years later
with the background of their thinking-a background that proved to be mis-
leading in the light of the revolutionary changes which were then just begin-
ning to be felt in the industry, but which found no place in the TNEC
inquiry. 67
1947-1949
This third period, 1947-1949, was the one with which the court was, of
course, to be primarily concerned in determining whether there should be a
decree against the defendants in a case the trial of which began in November
1950 and terminated in May 1953. An equity decree looks to the cure of
existing abuses, and evidence as to the past is useful only as it casts light
on the present and future. Yet, strangely enough, the bulk of the exhibits
upon which the Government particularly relied came from the period of
1934-1937. What the Government apparently did not realize until it was
disclosed by the stipulated statistical evidence was that, whatever may have
been its competitive condition in the period 1934-1937, the business was
revolutionized thereafter.
The decisive feature of this second revolution was that it was a revolu-
tion in the standards of competition. Investment bankers no longer competed
primarily against each other, but now had to compete against the great
aggregations of capital, such as the insurance companies, which were free
from the securities legislation because they could buy issues outright without
underwriting. This forced investment bankers into a struggle for survival,
in which they could only operate on a slender margin of profit because they
had always to compete with people who were immune from the expenses of
registration.
At the distributing end it has become customary to have only one syndicate
of underwriters. Today, with profit margins ever narrowing, the second, or
selling, syndicate is rarely formed. But the underwriting syndicate remains,
as an essential element of the system under which firms with small capital
can band together to compete with large aggregations of capital. An even
more profound change was felt at the buying end of the business, however.
The Government's case dealt almost exclusively with the classic form of
financing through investment bankers-known as the "negotiated underwrit-
ten" form, the negotiation, of course, being between the issuer and the one or
more investment bankers who, together with the issuer, work out the varied
details of the issue and then agree with the issuer on a price. This method
assumption that the recent investigations cited in Steffen, p. 170 n.7, have established what
he calls "post-1952 standards." Does he mean that witnesses are no longer to be treated
courteously or to answer questions fully?
67. The TNEC did not of course have access to such evidence; yet the TNEC made
no recommendation against the investment bankers, and as Judge Medina pointed out,
no TNEC monograph was written in regard to the investment banking evidence. United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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of negotiation accounted in the 1935-1937 period for over eighty per cent
of the dollar volume of bond financing and in 1947-1949 for less than
twenty per cent.6s Since Government counsel normally spoke as if this were
almost the only form of financing, and persistently offered documentary evi-
dence dating from 1935 and 1936, the court, not unnaturally, became prog-
ressively disillusioned. It became increasingly apparent that Government
counsel were living in the past and that the past had little connection with
the present.
Again, dollar volume of private placements, requiring no underwriting and
consequently no registration under the Securities Act, increased nearly eight
times from 1935-1937 to 1947-1949-from $958 million to $7,613 million.
And public sealed bidding, so-called "competitive bidding," almost all of
which was pursuant to federal or state order for railroad bonds and public
utilities, further narrowed the "negotiated underwritten" business by in-
creasing from $143 million in 1935-1937 to $5,434 million in 1947-1949.
Primary importance was attached by the Government to railroad issues. Yet,
there was not a single negotiated underwritten railroad issue in any one of
the years 1947-1949, and only four such between 1942 and 19 4 9 C2 In in-
dustrial bond financing the emergence of the insurance company resulted in
a dollar volume of private placements in 1947-1949 six times that of nego-
tiated underwritings. In 1935-1937 negotiated underwritings had been four
times the amount of private placements. The shift was, therefore, in the
proportion of tventy-four to one. These and innumerable other figures at-
tested to the revolution in financing.
But the investment bankers did not go out of business. They developed
new activities in order to survive. They made themselves useful to issuers
and insurance companies in working out the terms of private placements so
that by 1947-1949 approximately one-half of all private placements called for
the help of investment bankers in a purely agency or service capacity, for a
fee. They continued, of course, to handle "negotiated underwritten" financ-
ing, and to compete with one another for the privilege of doing so; but they
were always compelled also to compete with the now dominant non-under-
written private placement
As a class the bankers were particularly ingenious in the development of
forms of financing by stock issues. Equity financing has always been con-
sidered on the whole more healthy than debt financing. Making this field
particularly their own, investment bankers handled in 1947-1949 a total of
357 stock issues, so that eighty per cent of all negotiated underwritten issues
were issues of stock. This suggests the basic contribution of the investment
banker to modem financing: dealing closely with the corporation with respect
68. The relevant statistical data was all in the stipulated Issue Registers, Transcript
of Record, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), from which tables
and charts were prepared by both sides.
69. Yet the only two concrete events mentioned by Professor Steffen involved rail-
road issues. Steffen, p. 189.
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to shares of its own ownership and providing service in setting up and plac-
ing these shares. From the much larger field of bond debt financing the old
underwritten negotiated method has been largely crowded out-in the rail
and public utility fields largely by Government-imposed public sealed bid-
ding, and in all fields by the ease with which the great aggregations of
capital, such as insurance companies, can buy the entire issue with immunity
from Securities Act registration.
Against such facts, ignored in Professor Steffen's article, the Government's
case, with its persistent reminiscence of the history of railroad bond financ-
ings of twenty to fifty years before, and its stale air of old Pujo, Pecora,
and TNEC controversies and slogans, simply evaporated. 70
70. It is not right to close this reply without a word of protest to the language
that Professor Steffen has permitted himself in attacking a court, for having decided
against his side of a case, and the Department of Justice, for rejecting his recommendation
for appeal. If Judge Medina did err, at least the errors were not "gross" or "flagrant"
or "funny," Steffen, pp. 187, 193; nor did he "openly flout" the decided cases, Steffen,
p. 194. Of Judge Barnes he says that he was, for reasons that "would seem to be faintly
tinged with politics," Steffen, p. 170 n.12, conniving at violation of law, for the decision
not to appeal had "no rational basis," Steffen, p. 194, and Judge Barnes "must have under-
stood that, as a precedent, the case would greatly encourage the defendant bankers in
their noncompetitive ways of doing business." Steffen, p. 193.
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